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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Bree Leann Larosa appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction, 
wherein the district court imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one and one-
half years fixed, for Ms. Larosa's guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance. 
On appeal, Ms. Larosa asserts that the district court erred when it denied her motion to 
suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Officer Buhl was on patrol and observed a car that was exceeding the speed limit 
and failed to use a turn signal. (03/15/12 Tr., p.9, Ls.2-8.) Officer Buhl pulled the car 
over based on those observations. (03/15/12 Tr., p.9, Ls.13-15.) Officer Buhl identified 
the driver as Ms. Larosa. 1 (03/15/12 Tr., p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.3.) Officer Buhl noticed that 
Ms. Larosa was nervous, her hands were shaking, she had sores on her face, and her 
eyes were bloodshot. (03/15/12 T., p.72, Ls.14-22.) 
Based on those observations, Officer Buhl suspected that Ms. Larosa was under 
the influence of methamphetamine, so he asked her to step out of her vehicle. 
(03/15/12 Tr., 12, Ls.8-21, p.37, Ls.11-14.) Officer Buhl then retuned Ms. Larosa's 
identification and started asking her questions in order to determine if she was driving 
under the influence of drugs. (03/15/12 Tr., p.12, Ls.17-21.) After observing 
Ms. Larosa walking, he determined that she was not under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol. (03/15/12 Tr., p.39, Ls.3-9.) 
1 At the time of the suppression hearing Ms. Larosa was going by the name of Fromm. 
However, prior to sentencing she was divorced and changed her legal name to Larosa. 
(06/25/12 Tr., p.85, Ls.5-13.) 
1 
Officer Buhl then asked Ms. Larosa about the sores on her face, if she had any 
methamphetamine in her car, and if she had recently used methamphetamine. 
(03/15/12 Tr., p.14, Ls.6-19, p.42, Ls.8-11.) Ms. Larosa said she had not used 
methamphetamine in a while and that she did not have any in her car. (03/15/12 
Tr., p.14, Ls.11-19.) However, Ms. Larosa eventually told Officer Buhl that she had a 
syringe in her vehicle that had been used to inject methamphetamine. (03/15/12 
Tr., p.14, Ls.19-22.) Mr. Larosa agreed to allow Officer Buhl to search her vehicle and, 
in doing so, he found a syringe in her purse. (03/15/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.1-7.) After that 
discovery, Officer Buhl told Ms. Larosa he was not going to arrest her at that time, but 
he was going to have the syringe tested for the presence of methamphetamine. 
(03/15/12 Tr., p.17, Ls.11-22.) 
During her conversation with Officer Buhl, Ms. Larosa also told him that she had 
a son who had been removed from her home, as he was the subject of child protection 
proceedings. (R., p.22.) Ms. Larosa also admitted that she had used 
methamphetamine three days earlier and subsequently slept for three days. (03/15/12 
Tr., 14, L.23 - p.15, L.6.) 
The following day, Officer Buhl's supervisor spoke with him about his 
conversation with Ms. Larosa. (03/15/12 Tr., p.17, L.25 - p.18, L.7.) During that 
conversation, they discussed the possibility that Ms. Larosa might have another child 
living at her home. (03/15/12 Tr., p.18, L.11 - p.19, L.16.) Officer Buhl's supervisor 
then told him to stop by Ms. Larosa's home and conduct a welfare check. (03/15/12 
Tr., p.19, Ls.5-16.) 
2 
Later that evening, at approximately 11 :45 p.m., 2 Officer Buhl and another police 
officer, Officer Hanna, went to Ms. Larosa's home to conduct the welfare check. 
(03/15/12 Tr., p.20, Ls.6-9, p.47, Ls.9-19.) They arrived in two separate patrol cars and 
Officer Buhl went to the back entrance of Ms. Larosa's home and Officer Hanna went to 
the front entrance of her home. (03/15/12 Tr., p.20, L.6 - p.21, L.9.) Officer Buhl was 
armed with a gun. (03/15/12 Tr., p.28, Ls.2-4.) At the suppression hearing, Officer Buhl 
testified that he knocked on the back door of the home and Ms. Larosa opened the 
door.3 (03/15/12 Tr., p.21, Ls.10-17.) Officer Buhl then briefly explained why he was at 
her home and asked Ms. Larosa if the Officers could speak with her inside. (03/15/12 
Tr., p.21, Ls.18-22.) 
After they were inside, Officer Buhl discussed the incriminating statements 
Ms. Larosa made during the previous evening and then asked if she had any more 
children in her home. (03/15/12 Tr., p.23, Ls.5-10, p.50, L.25 - p.51, L.8.) Ms. Larosa 
told Officer Buhl that she had one more child, who was sleeping. (03/15/12 Tr., p.23, 
Ls.10-11.) Ms. Larosa asked Officer Buhl if he wanted to see the child and he said yes. 
(03/15/12 Tr., p.24, Ls.5-7.) While Officer Buhl was checking on the child, he noticed 
that Ms. Larosa's home was clean and orderly. (03/15/12 Tr., p.54, L.13 - p.55, L.4.) 
2 Officer Buhl previously had testified at the suppression hearing that he arrived at 
Ms. Larosa's home between 8 and 9 p.m. (03/15/12 Tr., p.19, L.20 - p.20, L.20, L.5.) 
However, he changed his testimony on cross examination. 
3 However, in the original police report, Officer Buhl wrote that Officer Hanna knocked 
on the front door while he was standing at the back door, and Ms. Larosa opened the 
back door of her home. (R., p.14.) According to the transcript of the suppression 
hearing, which was not referenced by either party or the district court at the suppression 
hearing, Officer Buhl testified that when he and Officer Hanna arrived at the house they 
walked around Ms. Larosa's residence for a few minutes while looking into her windows. 
(04/19/11 Tr., p.27, L.19-p.28, L.13; R., pp.71-75, 92-114.)Atthathearing, Officer Buhl 
also testified that he never knocked on the back door because Ms. Larosa opened it 
before he had the opportunity to knock. (04/19/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.18-23, p.27, L.19 - p.2, 
L.2.) 
3 
He also testified that the child was asleep in a clean bedroom. (03/15/12 Tr., p.54, L.13 
- p.55, L.4.) 
During the welfare check, Officer Buhl learned that Ms. Larosa's boyfriend, Ryan 
Peppers, was at her house that night. (03/15/12 Tr., p.55, L.11 - p.56, L.7.) After 
determining that Ms. Larosa's child was not in danger, Officer Buhl asked Ms. Larosa if 
he could speak with Mr. Peppers because Officer Buhl knew he was on probation. 
(03/15/12 Tr., p.26, Ls.4-9, p.27, Ls.12-17, p.55, Ls.21-25.) At that time, Mr. Peppers 
was sitting in a bedroom and he could hear this conversation. (03/15/12 Tr., p.27, L.6 -
p.28, L.11.) Mr. Peppers stood up and started walking out of the bedroom. (03/15/12 
Tr., p.28, Ls.7-11.) Officer Buhl told Mr. Peppers to stop walking. (03/15/12 Tr., p.28, 
Ls.12-14.) Officer Buhl then asked Ms. Larosa if he could speak with Mr. Peppers in the 
bedroom. (03/15/12 Tr., p.28, Ls.17-18.) Ms. Larosa did not "respond" to that question. 
(03/15/12 Tr., p.28. Ls.19-21.) Instead, she walked into the bedroom and Officer Buhl 
followed her and stopped at the bedroom door. (03/15/12 Tr., p.28, Ls.21-25.) 
From that vantage point, Officer Buhl noticed a glass pipe, which he associated 
with the use of marijuana. (03/15/12 Tr., p.29, Ls.13-18.) Ms. Larosa admitted that the 
pipe was for marijuana. (03/15/12 Tr., p.29, Ls.19-25.) Officer Buhl then asked 
Ms. Larosa if he could search the room and she said yes. (03/15/12 Tr., p.31, Ls.5-7.) 
Officer Buhl picked up a box and Ms. Larosa said that there was "something bad" in the 
box. (03/15/12 Tr., p.31, L.20 - p.32, L.1.) Based on Ms. Larosa's comment, he opened 
that box and it contained marijuana. (03/15/12 Tr., p.32, Ls.1-2.) At that point, Officer 
Buhl stopped his search and contacted Ms. Larosa's child's father. (03/15/12 Tr., p.32, 
L.8 - p.33, L.5.) 
4 
Officer Buhl then retrieved a camera from his patrol car and started taking 
pictures of Ms. Larosa's home. (03/15/12 Tr., p.33, Ls.6-12.) While taking these 
photographs, Officer Buhl returned to the bedroom where the marijuana was originally 
located and he noticed the lingering odor of marijuana. (03/15/12 Tr., p.33, Ls.13-21.) 
Officer Buhl decided to open a chest of drawers to see if there was more marijuana. 
(03/15/12 Tr., p.33, L.21 - p.34, L.3.) Officer Buhl discovered a secret compartment in 
the chest of drawers, which contained marijuana, cotton balls, a spoon, and syringes 
with white residue. (03/15/12 Tr., p.34, Ls.3-13.) Ms. Larosa was arrested. (03/15/12 
Tr., p.34, Ls.23-25.) 
Ms. Larosa was charged, by Information, with two counts of possession of a 
controlled substance, injury to a child, and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 77-
78.) Ms. Larosa then filed a motion to suppress, and at the suppression hearing 
Ms. Larosa argued that her consent to allow the officers into her home, enter the 
bedroom to speak with Mr. Peppers, and search the bedroom was coerced. 4 
(R., pp.92-115; 03/15/12 Tr., p.65, L.10 - p.69, L.6.) The district court denied 
Ms. Larosa's motion to suppress. (R., pp.144-145.) Ms. Larosa then entered a 
conditional guilty plea, preserving the ability to challenge the district court's order 
denying her motion to suppress. (R., pp.146-147.) Thereafter, the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one and one-half years fixed, but 
suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Larosa on probation. (R., pp.156-160.) 
Ms. Larosa timely appealed. (R., pp.171-173.) 
4 Ms. Larosa challenged other actions of Officer Buhl as being unconstitutional in the 
memorandum in support of her motion to suppress. (R., pp.92-112.) However, those 




Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Larosa's motion to suppress? 
6 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Larosa's Motion To Suppress 
A Introduction 
Ms. Larosa recognizes that the warrant requirement is obviated when the State 
obtains voluntary consent to search a home. However, Ms. Larosa argues that her 
consent to allow the Officers enter her home and subsequently search her home was 
not voluntarily given. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals 
articulated the following standard of review for an appeal from a motion to suppress: 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely 
review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. At a 
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is 
vested in the trial court. 
Id. at 302. (citations omitted). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Larosa's Motion To Suppress 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const. Art. I§ 17. The "physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . ... " State v. 
Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 523 (1986) (quoting United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)) (emphasis in original). 
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Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. State v. Martinez, 129 
Idaho 426, 431 (Ct. App. 1996). However, warrants are not required if a search falls 
under "a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 
(1967)); see also State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218 (1999). The State "bears the 
burden to demonstrate that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the 
circumstances." Martinez, 129 Idaho at 431 (citation omitted). If the government fails to 
meet this burden, the evidence acquired as a result of the illegal search, including later-
discovered evidence derived from the original illegal search, is inadmissible in court. 
Brauch, 133 Idaho at 219; Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984). 
"Voluntary consent to search from a person who has actual authority to so 
consent obviates the need for a warrant." State v. Fee, 135 Idaho 857, 862 (Ct. App. 
2001) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974)); Johnson, 110 Idaho 
at 522; State v. Ham, 113 Idaho 405, 406 (Ct. App. 1987). "Whether consent was 
granted voluntarily, or was a product of coercion, is a question of fact to be determined 
by all the surrounding circumstances." State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). 
"This includes accounting for subtle coercive police questions and the subjective state 
of the party granting consent to search." Id. Consent to search can be express or 
implied and Idaho appellate courts "defer to the trial court's findings of fact as to 
voluntariness." State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466, 472 (Ct. App. 2008). 
In this case, the district court made a factual finding that Officer Buhl's testimony 
was credible and that Ms. Larosa provided express consent for the officers to enter her 
home and to search the room where the contraband was found. (03/15/12 Tr., p.73, 
8 
L.21 - p.74, L.2.) The district court then made a factual finding that Ms. Larosa gave 
Officer Buhl implied consent to enter the bedroom to speak with Mr. Peppers. (03/15/12 
Tr., p.74, Ls.4-9.) The district court ultimately concluded that Ms. Larosa voluntarily 
consented to these searches. (03/13/12 Tr., p.74, L.25 - p.75, L.3.) 
Mindful of the applicable standard of review, which holds that factual findings that 
are supported by substantial and competent evidence are not to be second guessed on 
appeal and that the issue of voluntariness of a defendant's consent is a question of fact, 
Ms. Larosa argues that the district court's conclusion that her consent was voluntary is 
clearly erroneous. 
Ms. Larosa did not voluntarily consent to the officer's entry of her home. When 
the officers visited Ms. Larosa's home it was very late at night, approximately 11 :45 
p.m., and the officers arrived in two patrol cars. (03/15/12 Tr., p.47, Ls.9-19.) The 
coercive nature of this encounter was heightened when Officer Hanna went to the front 
door and Officer Buhl went to the back door. (03/15/12 Tr., p.21, Ls.10-17; R., p.106.) 
This would have communicated to Ms. Larosa she was not free to ignore the Officers 
Buhl's request to enter her home. Moreover, there was a significant show of authority 
as Officer Buhl was armed with a gun. (03/15/12 Tr., p.28, Ls.2-4.) This show of 
authority was amplified because Ms. Larosa recognized Officer Buhl from the traffic stop 
which occurred the previous evening. (03/15/12 Tr., p.50, L.25 - p.51, L.8.) 
In sum, the district court's conclusion that Ms. Larosa's consent to enter her 
home and subsequently search her home coerced. As such, all of the incriminating 
statements and evidence obtained by Officer Buhl while inside Ms. Larosa's home 
should have been suppressed by the district court. Therefore, the district court erred 
when it denied Ms. Larosa's motion to suppress. 
9 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Larosa respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying her motion to suppress and remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 4th day of March, 2013. 
) 
j 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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